This essay exists as a segment in a line of study and writing practice that moves between a critical theory analysis of translation studies conceptions of language, and the 1 The first group, the Live Translations consist of transcriptions I made from audio recordings read in a public setting, in which the texts were translated in situ, either off the page of original Spanishlanguage poems, or through a process very much like that carried out by simultaneous translators, for which readings of the poems were played back to me through headphones at varying speeds to be translated before the audience. The translations collected are imperfect renderings, attesting to a moment in language practice rather than language objects. The second method involves an iterative translation process, by which three versions of any one poem are rendered, with varying levels of fluency,
However, this operation does not take the name of translation according to Derrida's economy. The books don't balance. For 'the translation must be quantitatively equivalent to the original ' (2001: 179) . This quantity, he claims, must be measured by the number of words: 'The philosophy of translation, the ethics of translation-if translation does in fact have these things-today aspires to be a philosophy of the word, a linguistics or ethics of the word. At the beginning of translation is the word' (180).
And though most translation is more interested in the sense than the verbal, 'relevance' is still tied up with an ideal, not of word-for-word, but 'as close as possible to the equivalence of 'one word by one word,'' thereby respecting verbal quantity as a quantity of words, 'each of which is an irreducible body, the indivisible unity of a meaning or concept' (Derrida 2001: 181) . However words are at once stubbornly singular and irretrievably plural. The concept of différance critiques this conception of the word. For Derrida, meaning is an 'effect of relations and differences along a potentially endless chain of signifiers-polysemous, intertextual, subject to infinite linkages' (cited in Venuti 2003: 238) . As such meaning is always 'differential and deferred, never present as an original unity… a site of proliferating possibilities that can be activated in diverse ways by the receivers of an utterance,' which thus 'exceed the control of individual users' (Venuti 2003: 238) .
This intractable valency of words asserts itself wherever there is a homophonic or homonymic effect. It is at this moment that translation acknowledges its impossibility.
For a homonym or homophone defies word-to-word translation2. It necessitates either the resignation to the loss of effect, economy, strategy-and 'this loss can be enormous'-or the addition of some kind of gloss, a translator's note, which 'even in the best of cases … confesses the impotence or failure of the translation' (Derrida 2001: 181) .
3 While the translator's note achieves an explanation of the meaning and effects in the original, it breaks with 'the economic law of the word, which defines the essence of translation in the strict sense' (181). Nothing is untranslatable. Nothing is translatable.
The last way out of this impossible task of translation is through an interrogation of the relation of impossibility to possibility, an interrogation that Derrida initiates through a translation, his text argues across them. It moves along a different axis. Benjamin's methodology is a kind of strange, intuitive science that picks apart the seemingly cohesive fabric of language to look at the constitution of the thread. If language is like cotton, he analyses the makeup of tropical flora; if it is like gossamer, he is talking about the sociology of spiders.
The influence that Benjamin's ideas would have on my thinking was not immediate upon first reading his essay. It seemed to have some relevant insights, and the citations from Rudolf Pannwitz seemed especially important. The notion that the translator must allow his own language 'to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue' (cited in Benjamin 1968: 81) , immediately resonated with my intuitive ideas about the purpose of translation. As a whole however, the article was one that I passed over quickly in search of more ideal material. My lack of receptiveness stemmed in part from a paralysing aversion to terms such as pure, true, absolute. The idea of a pure languagewhen my interests lay in the hybrid, interwoven, interstitial qualities of languagesseemed, if not objectionable, then at least unduly aggrandising. Derrida mentions something similar in relation to Heidegger's terminology on language: 'I do not much like the term "essence" of language. I would prefer to give a more living and dynamic meaning to this way of being, to this manifestation of linguistic spectrality, which is valid for all languages ' (2005: 105) .
In time I realised that Benjamin's notion of pure language (reine Sprache) was an important idea. Not only did it contain a recognition of the 'inner relation' between languages, but also an understanding of some kind of movement in expression, of which the textual body of language scarcely bears a trace. As I read over the text again and again, as well as other writers' readings of it, I began noting down all the important citations. I seemed to be rewriting the text almost line by line. Eventually, I began to develop the feeling that what I was doing was actually something like the character Pierre Menard from Borges's ficto-philosophical essay, originally published in 1941, 'Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote' (1965) . I felt closer to this text than to much of my own writing, which seemed never to reach its mark.
What I had initially perceived as a movement in language, which is generally left unrecognised by most translation/literary theory, was described in Benjamin's description of that element in language that 'cannot be communicated ' (1968: 79) . This element is either something that symbolizes or something symbolized. It is the former only in the finite products of language, the latter in the evolving of the languages themselves. And that which seeks to represent, to produce itself in the evolving of languages, is that very nucleus of pure language. Though concealed and fragmentary, it is an active force in life as the symbolized thing itself, whereas it inhabits linguistic creations only in symbolized form. While that ultimate essence, pure language, in the various tongues is tied only to linguistic elements and their changes, in linguistic creations it is weighted with a heavy, alien meaning. To relieve it of this, to turn the symbolizing into the symbolized, to regain pure language fully formed in the linguistic flux, is the tremendous and only capacity of translation. (80) This should not be taken to mean that works of translation are written in this pure language. Translations still take form within one or another of the fallen languages of man. It is only a 'somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languages' (75), and it represents the inner relationship between languages by 'realizing it in embryonic or intensive form' (73). The relation of languages is based on the fact that they are not strangers, but are related in what they want to express (73). It is this intention in language that constitutes the relationship between languages, and also, which is the aim of translation: to reach for a mode of intention, which complements that of the original. In this way, the sense of the original is not something to be conveyed; in fact, translation must 'in large measure refrain from wanting to communicate something, from rendering sense' (79).
The original is important to the translation only by relieving the translator 'of the effort of assembling and expressing what is to be conveyed' (79). The translation owes its existence to the original but does not serve it (72). Their kinship is not one of likeness (74), but rather involves the search for the 'intended effect upon the language into which' the work is being translated, so as to 'produce in it an echo of the original' (77).
This echo, Christopher Fynsk explains, makes 'the symbolizing dimension of the original reverberate in a kind of sympathetic vibration ' (1996: 185) .
The translation is not interested in any 'core of meaning latent in the original' (Fynsk 1996: 185) , since 'meaning is never found in relative independence, as in individual words or sentences' (Benjamin 1968: 75) , 4 rather it is interested with the original's core meaning only insomuch as it 'lends itself to complementation and ultimately a harmony' (Fynsk 1996: 185) . In an earlier essay on language, originally published in 1916, Benjamin argues that language communicates the 'mental being' of things only insofar as it is included in its linguistic being, 'insofar as it is capable of being communicated ' (1996: 63) . The translation only hopes to 'touch the original lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the sense' (Benjamin 1968: 81) , as a tangent touches a curve. Sense is touched lightly, not conveyed. This sentiment is echoed by Derrida when he describes translation as coming to 'lick' the body of the 'idiomatic singularity' of the word as a flame or an amorous tongue might, 'refusing at the last moment to consume or consummate ' (2001: 175) . Weaving together Derrida and Benjamin, this flame leaves the body of the word intact-though not without eliciting the appearance of the other, drawing it out (Derrida 2001: 175 )-and it is at this point, that translation 'catches fire on the eternal life of the works and the perpetual renewal of language' (Benjamin 1968: 75) . And it is at this moment that we arrive before the possibility of learning something of our relation with language.
Translation as experimentum linguae
In his preface to Infancy and History, Giorgio Agamben makes the claim that 'one of the most urgent tasks for contemporary thought is, without a doubt, to redefine the concept of the transcendental in terms of its relation with language ' (1993: 4) .
Refiguring Kant's concept of the transcendental, which omitted the question of language, Agamben proposes that the transcendental 'must instead indicate an experience which is undergone only within language, an experimentum linguae in the true meaning of the words, in which what is experienced is language itself' (4). To undergo an experience with something involves some kind of submission to it. 'This something befalls us, strikes us, overwhelms and transforms us … the experience is not of our own making … we endure it, we suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it' (Heidegger 1971: 57) . Language requires rendition. As well as being something to which we surrender, Heidegger states that an experience means 'to attain something by going on a way' (66). We must, therefore, make some sort of movement-a movement in language-in order to gain some knowledge of our relation to language. The task here is largely one of thinking. Not a putting of questions, but a listening for what is to be put in question (71).
But language is too close to us. We find ourselves entangled and compromised by the web of language. However if we take notice of the 'peculiar properties of thought,' and (Agamben 1991: 62) . In fact, it is possible that we are not able to say anything concrete about our relation to language. 'There is some evidence,'
Heidegger states, that the essential nature of language flatly refuses to express itself in words ' (1971: 81) . We may only be able to submit ourselves to an experience with it and carry on our way, somehow enriched by the experience. That silent experience is what we must carry over into our writing-and translation-practice.
Just as the claim I mean what I say did not circumvent the problem of the referents of language and meaning in the earlier discussion, neither does our apparent and undeniable relation with language silence the question of an experience with language.
To say I speak does not resolve Agamben's 'stubbornly pursued train of thought: what is the meaning of 'I speak'? ' (1993: 5) . Speech teaches us next to nothing about language since we are only able to simply 'go ahead and speak a language' precisely because language does not bring itself to language in this context but 'holds back' (Heidegger 1971: 59) . Similarly, we understand and take for granted that we breathe air constantly, but this tells us little of air and still less of our experience of it. If we have to struggle for air however, we come closer to an understanding of our need for it. We may not understand the mechanics, but in moments of asphyxiation, we understand something about our relation with it. This also holds for language.
Heidegger explains that language speaks itself as language 'when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us ' (1971: 59) . It is then that we 'leave unspoken what we have in mind and … language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being' (59). This makes sense within Benjamin's framework also, if we imagine that in that moment of aphasia, language gives up on the business of signifying this or that object, and we find ourselves engaged in a moment of intention.
Oddly, it is while we mean to say something, rather than when we have assigned a word to mean something, that we are most in contact with language as language. In
Heidegger's terminology, because we are being touched by the essence of language; in Benjamin's because we have not yet translated pure language into fallen language. For Agamben, the split that Benjamin finds in language is still relevant, however the division is not so much between pure language and languages, but rather is ' a fracture inherent in human language' (Bartoloni 2004) . In the work of Agamben, this moment of the self-presentation of language occurs in the notion of infancy 5 : 'Infancy is an experimentum linguae of this kind, in which the limits of language are to be found not outside language, in the direction of its referent, but in an experience of language as such, in its pure self reference' (Agamben 1993: 5) .
The relation here to translation is evident. Translation, as a form, acknowledges its own aphasia: its impossible possibility, its 'devotion to ruin,' as Derrida (2001: 181) would have it. Having language as its only referent, it then sets about a movement toward other language, to other words. Time after time it comes upon a lack of words and paradoxically moves through pleonastic turns to overcome that loss. The translator, amongst two (in)complete systems of expression, is swamped by language yet continually at a loss for words. To return to the air metaphor, it is like breathing out of the window of a speeding car. The air rushes towards us yet we struggle to inhale. The translator has two languages on which to hold but is forever slipping between them.
It is no coincidence that my interest in the strangeness and the limits of language first asserted itself while I was living abroad. For the first time in my life I had to defend myself in a language which was not my own. I quickly began to realise the peculiar enabling and limiting force of the English language with/in which I had grown up. 6 To deform Wittgenstein's maxim; until then, the limits of my world had been the limits of my language. In a new world a new set of limits set in relief the limits of my language, the limits of my world. The experience is described by Octavio Paz in which the immediate emotions one feels before an unknown language quickly transform themselves into doubts about our own language, as 'El lenguaje pierde su universalidad y se revela como una pluralidad de lenguas' (loses its universality and reveals itself as a plurality of languages) 7 (1970: 9).
5 Referring to the etymological root of the term meaning unable to speak, rather than the developmental stage. 6 The English I have come to speak of course being merely a composite of a small sample of all the Englishes spoken in my immediate environs and throughout the world. Largely shaped by the locality and familial settings in which I was raised, it also works against much of that language, taking equal parts from pop-culture, high culture, academia, etc. 7 My translation.
In another language, we are constantly 'leaving unspoken what we have in mind' (Heidegger 1971: 59) . In our despair at the abandonment of language, we sense the magnitude-without implying in any way a perfect relational system-of language.
Wittgenstein's statement makes sense to us, that 'the correct expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the world, albeit as expressing nothing within language, In order to position the translation methods that I have employed within the discussions initiated in this piece, I want to initiate a further discussion that simultaneously answers to two lines of questioning. I say answers to because the discussion doesn't offer definitive resolutions to the questions, but rather responds to the call of the questions.
Each question contains a guiding word that, rather than defining and circumscribing the discussion, persistently calls itself out in its full polysemy, returns to the text over and over, forging a presence that is more spectral than definitive. These two words are relief and failure, or relieving and failing. The two methods: the Series Translations and the Live Translations, though autonomous, are for me interrelated. So much so in fact, that I find myself unable to conduct two separate discussions; first of one, then of the other.
Once again I find myself caught between two paths, two movements, two modes of intention, and the only way forward seems to be to somehow knit the two together. Questions, especially as they are posited within a text, always involve a strange, false step in language and thought. They perform in a genuinely dramatic fashion, an almost embarrassing theatre of ventriloquism. As in a performance which seeks audience participation through friends with rehearsed questions, it tacitly suggests the clichéd response: well I'm glad you asked that … The writer impersonates a presumed response is provoked in the reader, when in fact-a fact we all, with good grace, pretend not to know-the writer chooses to ask questions to which s/he wishes to respond.
The questions that initiate this dual discussion, however, are doubly provocative. Both might seem non sequiturs. Then suggests a logical progression, but the discussion thus far has said nothing of relieving or failing translations. However, relief and failure are relevant to translation as I have framed it, and in employing the two terms, I have already begun to clear the way for a response.
To begin with the second question, I would say that if I achieve anything with my Live
Translations, it will be a failure. That is not to say that I regard achievement as failure, but rather that I am aiming to prepare the way for an experience with language. And if, as suggested earlier, we only come to know language through moments of failure, of abandonment, when 'we leave unspoken what we have in mind' (Heidegger 1971: 59) , then a translation method that aims at some sort of experimentum linguae must engage with those moments which are ever-present in the taking place of translation. However, while traditional translation methods tend to cover those tracks, the Live Translation brings them out into the open for all to see and hear. So it is in that sense that I actively seek out failures, moments where the word breaks up, necessitating a 'true step back on the way of thinking' (Heidegger 1971: 108) .
In a sense, the first question is a translational adaptation of the question asked by Derrida in his 'Qu'est-ce qu'une traduction "relevante"? ' (1999) , to which I have referred earlier through the wonderfully abusive translation by Lawrence Venuti (Derrida 2001 ' (1985: 270) .
This resonates strongly with the preoccupations of this essay, and after reading of adequate, natural, faithful renderings, I was relieved to read this in an academic text.
However, it is possible that my translations go further than the abusive fidelity that Lewis articulates. The abuse principle does not 'risk sacrificing rigour to facility … faithful transmission to playful tinkering with style and connotation ' (1985: 270) . I don't know if I can say the same for my Series Translations, or even some of the Live Translations. It is true that they may seem close to the naïve abandonment of 'grammatical, syntactic, and stylistic considerations,' in favour of a 'free-for-all approach' (Bartoloni 2003) . However I wanted to push out to the extremes of the language of the original, and follow that out to the extremes of English, seeking out the 'unthinkable in the unsaid or the unsayable.' Or, as Heidegger puts it, 'venturing, like the word of the poets, to that limit where the experience of the taking place of language in the Voice and in death is complete ' (1971: 286 The Series Translations at least, seem to fail to adhere to the quantity of the original by creating three poems from one original. As to property, the question is more interesting.
In the Live Translations, there is an immediate, failing and flailing attempt to make the original proper, the most 'appropriating and appropriate' (Derrida 2001: 179) .
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Essentially it is a translation that adheres to the ideas of form and content, but at the same time it subjects 'translation to an aleatory adventure,' putting 'languages in contest, exposing one language to predation from another' (Rasula & McCaffery 1998: 247-248), though not in the disembodied space of the page, but in a visibly and audibly dynamic physical environment.
In the Series Translations, although the first two incarnations seem to comply quite strictly with the notion of the proper, of proper meaning and appropriateness, the third might seem to go too far, to break free from the language of the original and cease to merit the title of translation. 12 However I found it to be the most appropriate way to make the original proper to me, to my way of thinking and writing. of 'a work never penned' (Agamben 1993: 3) . Everything that I write will be shadowed by what I was unable to reach, what is determined to remain unsaid.
Again I return to failure and again I look for relief. For a way of translating that, rather than attempting to replace the original, looks to set it in relief against its possible renderings in another language. The renderings aim to touch the poems at a point. But rather than one rendering touching the poem at one point, there are several versions touching at varying points. To take Benjamin's idea of echo and harmony, and Fynsk's extension to the idea of sympathetic vibration, each incarnation aims to strike a note in language-having listened for tones in the original-hoping to hear in return some kind of resonance, some kind of harmony. The note struck each time is slightly different, and hopes to resonate with the mode of intention of the original in a slightly different way.
Perhaps one is major and one is minor. The third incarnation may have wandered too far or not far enough, but I think that, particularly as it sits couched within the context of the two earlier variations, some kind of reverberation is created. The Live Translations are struck here only once, but in their immediacy, they know that next time they will hit a different note, and will never be completely replicable. Hopefully though, at some point in these reverberations, the 'heavy, alien meaning,' which weighs pure language in the originals, is to some extent 'relieved' (Benjamin 1968: 80) .
Another aim in creating these iterative, indeterminate models is to forge a form of translating which fails to side with either departure or arrival; the unity of the original or the unity of the translation. In much contemporary study, as Paolo Bartoloni notes, there is a trend to trade 'transparency,' 'faithfulness' and 'equivalence'-associated with a tendency to 'assimilate the other'-for 'difference' and 'resistance ' (2003) . While there are obvious gains from such an approach, this manoeuvre fails to break the arrival/departure distinction. This represents a longstanding dichotomy described by particularly translation-with its fundamental connection to the relation of meaning and the evolution of language-has to take into account the 'negative breath of Geist' at every point in speech, and the 'unspeakability of Meinung' in every word (Agamben 1991: 14) . A text is not a mere expression of the thought and emotion of the author, but rather attests to the struggling movement in language of its conception. In Benjamin's language: it represents the 'death mask of its conception ' (1996: 65) . The inability to merely express oneself is represented by the text. Instead of signaling something concrete, it bears witness to a mode of intention toward an impossible signaling. In other words: it does not signal or make statements, it merely signs the statement. And if this is true, then shouldn't a translation-and by extension any writing-method bring out and make evident the scars of this voyage in language? Both translation methods attempt this. One does this through textual experimentation and transformation, the 13 As in most older texts on translation, the translator here is distinctively gendered. I can't help but feel somewhat culpable here when many of the texts that have informed this investgation have been translations rendered by women. No doubt whole books could be written on the position of women in translation, the silencing of an already silenced figure. other through performative improvisation. In another form, I have also tried to approach this through my Illustrations. They attempt a kind of writing that is continually thwarted in what they intend. They fail continually to put into words what they have in mind, and thus in saying something else, they recognise themselves as their own broken moulds or death masks. Rather than echos of an original in a translation, they try to become echoes of their other, potential selves. The weight of saying what they mean is relieved, but hopefully in that process they are afforded a greater kind of significance. Just as the original 'has already relieved the translator and his translation of the effort of assembling and expressing what is to be conveyed' (Benjamin 1968: 79) .
The last relieving function of translation (outlined here, at least) involves an effort to in some way relieve standardized (standardised? Americanised?) English of its hegemonic dominance, and the ensuing tendency to take 'as universal' 'the 'you' for whom I claim to speak-and hence the 'I' who speaks' (Venuti 2003: 237) . This is obviously a much greater task than any single project can think of achieving. But any translation into English in a small way helps to equalise-or at least helps initiate a movement toward the equalising-the inequity of cultural exchange that Venuti recognises (2003: 237) . The voices of others? The voicelessness of my own thought? Translation offers a means of minoritising standardised English. In Deleuze and Guattari's dialect, certain literary texts can increase the 'radical heterogeneity' of language by 'submitting the major language to constant variation, forcing it to become minor, delegitimizing, deterritorializing, alienating it' (cited in Venuti 1998: 10). Translation then, is a 'potential site of variation' (Venuti 1998: 10) , questioning the 'seeming unity of standard English' (11).
As well as this translation contains within it a threat to what Charles
So my translations, through a motivation that is theoretical, experiential and political, fail to surrender linguistic creations to the standard dialect. If it is true that 'there is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity' (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 8) , then translation can help to destabilise that takeover. This destabilising force has implications for all language practice. In
Benjamin's words, content and language form a unity like 'a fruit and its skin ' (1968: 76) . However, the organic notion of a text is always an illusion. The text was always falling apart (though perhaps the fruit and skin image holds, since the skin is always loosening itself from the flesh, first in the process of ripening, then of rotting); as de Man puts it: translations 'kill the original, by discovering that the original was already dead ' (1986: 84) . This does not stand only for translation. There is a kind of pleat involved in firstly engaging with difference in language through translation, and then folding that back over into my own writing in my proper tongue. It is not enough to create translations that signal the 'otherness' of the foreign text. Writing in English involves a tendency toward the kind of universalism mentioned earlier, and merely signalling otherness in translations threatens to leave the standardised language of literary texts unshaken. The effect that translation has on our relation to our own languages should carry over into other kinds of writing practice. This is because translation offers, if not the guarantee, then at least the uncertain invitation, to radically alter our relation to our own language, to become foreigners, 'but in one's own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one's own' (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 98) . When we engage with translated material and allow ourselves to be transformed by it, then we have to admit to there being something between us and our language. It involves a separate way of movement (Benjamin's mode of intention), though we cannot come face to face with it. The image that comes to mind is of a screen. One of those translucent Japanese screens that are used to divide a room. The room we are in is the room of language, and we can make out the movement of figures behind the screen. We cannot touch the figure, but we can see, ever so hazily, their moving form. The figure behind the screen will seem at turns awkward, at turns breathtakingly graceful and economic, and we can only begin to imagine how to mimic that movement. This is the task of the translator: to bring that movement onto the other side of the screen. Or rather, to bring it closer, if still behind a nearer, more translucent screen.
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The Series Translations
Translation is removal from one language into another through a continuum of transformations … not abstract areas of identity and similarity. Walter Benjamin (1996: 70) .
NUNCA LO SUFICIENTEMENTE
NUNCA LO SUFICIENTEMENTE levantadas las faldas, nunca los pantalones fácilmente alejados del lugar del suceso; vértigo al nacer en deshacer el horizonte indefinidamente y un encaje en del mar las enaguas.
NEVER (THE) SUFFICIENTLY
NEVER THE SUFFICIENTLY lifted the skirts, never the pants easily distanced from the place of the happening; vertigo at to be born in to undo the horizon indefinitely and a fitting-in of the sea the enwaters. 'The translator, per definition, fails.' Paul de Man (1986: 80) .
The Live Translations
On Transcribing the Spoken
Obviously, in transcribing spoken language, some things are lost and some gained. But the overriding feeling is one of loss. For Barthes, it is in the first place an 'innocence' that is lost. Not because speech is 'in itself fresh, natural, spontaneous, truthful, expressive of a kind of pure interiority,' but because it is tactical. And in passing to the written word, this tactic, 'perceptible to one who knows how to listen, as others know how to read,' is erased (1974: 3-4) . In these transcriptions I have deliberately attempted not to clean up the text too much, to leave in some of those 'scraps of language' (4), the phatic and paralinguistic features of the reading, some of which are inevitably lost in any transcription which doesn't resort to copious explanatory notes. I have decided to represent these elements through quite a conventional typographical format. Rather than developing a specific typography to represent the spoken form of the translations-as in the talk pieces of David Antin, for example-I have chosen to lay out the translations as they appear in the original poems, with omissions or additions where they occur in the translation. As such, the majority of the transcriptions effect a strange kind of erasure of the original, as if by accident.
Thinking of birds, Barthes referes to those desperate, interpellant moments in speech, through which a body seeks another body, as songs. 'Gauche, flat, ridiculous when written down' (5), this song is extinguished in our writing. Reading over the transcriptions however, I note at times, in the desperate omissions and catachresis, a strange velocity and force in the language. It may not be the song to which Barthes refers, but it does seem to contain a musical drive which is particular to the wins and losses of the transcription of this specific mode of relation in language.
But writing is not the written; transcription produces a very different textual product to the action that we generally call writing. So these transcriptions have a different place within the body of the text to the other, more writerly elements. They are incomplete documentations of an event. The process leaves things unsaid in ways that straight onthe-page writing does not. One example is the inevitable loss of homonymic ambiguities. When I say the phonetic unit mo (u) 
